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Abstract 
This paper discusses changes in the Chinese competition policy regime and 
analyses the key drivers of this process against the background of the Chinese 
choice for gradual and pragmatic structural reform.  
Keywords 
Competition policy, antitrust, global governance, development, structural 
reform, China 
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Chinese competition: do we need a new competition 
policy regime? 
Only three years ago the development of the world economic structure 
appeared to be sound, sustainable and on track with a clear and consistent 
movement towards an efficient market driven multilaterally governed global 
system. The so-called Washington Consensus (which basically reflected the key 
neoclassical insights, including the vital importance of properly functioning 
markets and their underpinning institutions) governed policy debates (and the 
curricula of universities).  
The emergence of this mainstream analysis had its roots in the 1980s 
when policy makers all around the globe felt the need for market-oriented 
reforms of the economic structures. In the developing world the process 
reflected the failure of the system of central planning of the economy that was 
a common feature of the development ideology prevalent in the 1960s and 
1970s. This failure of central planning was evident in all countries that we now 
know as the BRIIC group of emerging economies. In Latin America import 
substitution strategies failed and fossilized industries that were protected from 
(international) competition lost market shares both at home and abroad 
(Taylor, 1998, Mesquita Moreiraa 2007). The leap-forward strategy that had 
prioritized heavy industry had completely failed to deliver the desired catching 
up with the industrialized economies, not only in the major communist 
economies (China and the former USSR), but also in India and other non-
communist countries (Lin, 2009). As a consequence of the recognized failures 
of state dirigisme and protectionism, economic policies became increasingly 
competition oriented and stimulated both openness and international 
integration. 
The reorientation of economic policy was, incidentally, not limited to the 
developing world. Also in the OECD area the detrimental experiences of 
stagflation, excessive taxation and inertia and inflexibility of both product 
markets and labour markets led to an ambitious and influential programme of 
structural reform in the advanced economies (van Sinderen, 1993). This 
process stood at the basis of the ‘Europe 1992’ program for the internal 
market (Emerson et al 1988). A program that was effective and influential as it 
changed the competition policy landscape in Europe and inter alia led to the 
new Dutch competition law and the establishment of the NMa in 1998 (van 
Bergeijk and Haffner, 1996). 
All in all in the 1990s a global reorientation was taking place in all major 
economies and given the performance of the world economic system in terms 
of prices, employment and production during the ensuing period of the Great 
                                                 
 Pierrette Gaasbeek is Unit Manager Energy & Transport at the Dutch Competition 
Authority NMa. Peter van Bergeijk is Professor of International and Macro 
Economics at ISS. A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the seminar ‘Is 
there an Economic Case for International Rules on Competition Law?’, Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, The Hague (October 13, 2010). Comments by Jarig van Sinderen 
are gratefully acknowledged. 
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Moderation, the new market oriented policy environment appeared to be ready 
for the twenty-first century.1  
The financial crisis that hit the world economy in 2008, however, 
drastically changed this perspective (van Bergeijk et al. 2011). The initial 
economic answer to the crisis has been Keynesian with an unprecedented 
relaxation of monetary policy (especially quantitative easing), fiscal stimulus 
packages and support for the financial sector. Additionally, the apparent failure 
of markets fuelled demand for a larger role for government in terms of 
regulation, supervision and involvement. 
It is also relevant that economic growth recovered quickly (and often 
growth simply continued) in those quarters of the world where state 
intervention still plays an important if not dominant role, in particular the 
BRIIC countries. This decoupling of economic fortunes that took place 
between the OECD and the BRIIC countries does not only question the 
validity of policy frameworks that essentially rely on markets; it also boosts 
self-confidence in the BRIIC countries in their own approach that mixes 
markets and public sector involvement and puts more weight on government 
as an actor and catalyst for development. 
Against this background we plan to take a closer look at competition 
policy in the People’s Republic of China. One reason for this endeavour is that 
the Chinese approach of gradual and experimental change differs 
fundamentally from the Big Bang approach that was followed by the former 
communist states in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. A second reason is 
that China is increasingly being recognized as one of the key players in the 
global community: its share in the world economy and its role in global 
governance (like that of the BRIIC countries in general) have substantially 
increased and are expected to continue to grow (Kaplinky and Messner 2008). 
Therefor the non-OECD view on markets and governments will gain weight 
already in the near future. Table 1 illustrates the relevant trends in the world 
economy that recently probably have only been strengthened due to the severe 
slump in the OECD. 
TABLE 1 
 Shifting Shares in the World Economy (1995 versus 2015) 
1995 Per cent 2015 Per cent 
Europe 40 Europe 23 
US 16 China 17 
Japan 7 US 11 
China 2 Japan 4 
    
Rest of Asia 14 Rest of Asia 15 
Rest of the world 14 Rest of the world 30 
Source: Based on Hervé et al. 2007 
                                                 
1 The point is of course not that everybody was happy with the system. Many critical 
voices were raised. A clear example is Stiglitz’s Nobel  Price Lecture (Stiglitz). 
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Based on a long run OECD study that was published actually just before the 
outbreak of the financial and economic crisis, Table 1 provides details 
regarding the unprecedented fragmentation of economic power over the 
period 1995–2015 as the C3 ratio (the share of the three largest economic 
players) decreases from 63 to 51 per cent and the Herfindahl index about 
halves (from a score of 1909 to 995). The decrease of the ‘monopoly power’ of 
the market oriented countries that stood at the very basis of the international 
institutions (IMF, World Bank, OECD) is also reflected by the observation 
that the share of Europe, the US and Japan over this period decreases from 63 
per cent to 38 per cent.  
It is naïve to believe that such a shift in economic power will not translate 
into a shift in the politics of international governance and therefor one should 
expect a change in the norms and values in the global economic system. The 
non-OECD perspective is not anti-capitalistic per se, but gives more weight to 
co-ordination and the long-run effects of policies than is usually the case in the 
industrialized countries that essentially favour the atomistic individual freedom 
to choose. Bomhoff and Man Li Gu (2011) empirically investigate if and how 
modernization influences values and while they uncover substantial change 
into the direction of rational and individualistic value systems in the industrial 
coastal regions of China, it is also relevant that higher income is associated 
with a more traditional value orientation (and if so economic growth will not 
be associated with a more Western orientation but rather with an Asian type of 
social market economy). The probability of a change in the basic norms and 
values in world economic governance is not to be ignored, especially since it 
will be more difficult for the market economies to continue to exercise global 
leadership and global public goods (rules, institutions, etc.)  in a highly 
fragmented world (Olson 1965) so that competition between the different 
competition policy regimes and philosophies is a realistic scenario. This 
provides yet another reason why a better understanding of the determinants of 
China’s competition policy is important.  
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. In Section 1 we 
discuss the reasons behind the Chinese model and argue that these drivers will 
remain valid in the foreseeable future. In particular we believe that China’s 
national interest rather than a specific ideology will be the key determinant of 
its future actions. Section 2 then discusses the evolution and features of the 
Chinese competition policy and its instruments. We contrast these aspects with 
the characteristics of the competition policy framework(s) in Europe. In the 
final section we speculate about the potential impact of the new role and 
influence of China on (global) competition rules and enforcement and offer a 
recipe to meet the Chinese competition.  
1 Crossing the River 
The roots of China’s new competition policy are to be found in Deng 
Xiaoping’s gradually implemented economic reforms: just as one crosses a 
river by climbing from one stepping stone to another the economic system is 
to be reformed step by step. This idea (that already in the early 1980s guided 
policy changes aimed at more autonomy for farmers and firms and a better 
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functioning of the incentive systems in China) contrasts with the Big Bang 
approach that was characteristic of Michael Gorbachev’s Glasnost in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union. Clearly, (geo) political differences may explain 
why one communist empire opted for pragmatic gradualism and another 
communist empire chooses the short cut of deep recession and high-speed 
adjustment.2  The ad hoc character and broad range of institutional changes 
and industry specific reforms, however, can also be recognized in the way 
structural reforms were implemented in New Zealand in the early 1990s (Hall 
1999); New Zealand for quite some years was the show case for structural 
reform in the OECD. The Chinese model differs from these approaches and 
did so notably well before the negative consequences of the Big Bang approach 
in terms of temporary output loss and unemployment became clear. Basically 
the Chinese did it their way and probably most likely for cultural and historic 
reasons rather that based on an economic analysis of the costs and benefits of 
different adjustment trajectories. 
1.1 Theoretical underpinning of gradual reform 
Importantly, however, the Chinese policy model of gradual and experimental 
adjustment processes also has important economic underpinnings. This 
economic theory is discussed in several publications (co-)authored by Justin 
Yifu Lin, who is presently senior vice president and chief economist of the 
World Bank (for example Lin et al. 1998 and Lin 2009).  
A first key insight is that the communist command and control economies 
that mobilized domestic capital via forced savings and prioritized heavy 
industries (steel, machinery, vehicles, etc.) severely distorted the 
macroeconomic environment since the prices of the production factors (wages 
and interest) and (intermediate) inputs3 were set at artificially low levels (and 
accompanied by strict quantity targets). Two important aspects of 
macroeconomic distortion are especially relevant. The first issue is that a 
pattern of specialization develops that actually works against comparative 
advantage (Oldersma and van Bergeijk, 1992, van Sinderen and van Bergeijk 
1994, Lin, 2003). The alternative would be to upgrade the endowment 
structure – that is fast accumulation of (human) capital – rather than the 
industry/technology sector which would react and on a trial and error basis 
would follow and develop comparative advantage.  
The second issue is that state owned enterprises appear to be healthy at the 
outset of structural reforms because they often reap monopoly rents at 
suboptimal input prices and output quantities. Hughes and Hare (1991) even 
established that for many Eastern European products negative added value 
would occur if outputs (i.e. the products) and inputs (capital, labour, raw 
                                                 
2 Actually, the Big Bang approach may have been politically motivated by the desire to 
permanently destroy the power structures of the Communist Party and set irrevocable 
steps towards private production (and a way from the big conglomerates of state 
owned enterprises. 
3 This did not only have implications for the pricing policy for, e.g., raw materials, but 
also for the exchange rate. 
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materials and intermediate inputs) were valued at market prices. A Big Bang 
approach and instant liberalization imposes an idiosyncratic shock in input 
costs, output prices and production processes that exposes these weaknesses 
instantly (as it did in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and 
incidentally also in New Zealand) with strong reductions in production and 
significant increases in unemployment as direct consequences (see van Bergeijk 
and Lensink 1993). Also from this perspective it is important to note that 
although non-state production exceeds production in the state sector, regions 
and sectors of the economy may still be dominated by state owned enterprises 
(SOEs). In 1996, the share of SOEs in total industrial output stood at 29%. 
Importantly, however, 57% of urban population and 52% of fixed industrial 
investment was still accounted for by state owned enterprises (Lin et al, 1998, 
p. 422). This insight stood at the basis of the Chinese choice to give priority to 
reducing the policy burdens first (that is the macroeconomic distortions that 
follow from central planning). 
At the practical level of implementation, gradual reforms were introduced 
giving opportunities and autonomy to new enterprises4, including the so-called 
township and village enterprises, in order to allow markets to develop and to 
provide the necessary adjustment time to state owned enterprises. Moreover, 
so-called Special Economic Zones had been created (starting in the early 1980s  
FIGURE 1 
 GDP per capita 1950-2008 (constant 1990 international dollars) 
 
Source: Maddison data base available at http://www.ggdc.net 
                                                 
4 According to Lin et al. (1998, p. 425) the share of the township and village 
enterprises in total industrial output increased from 7% in 1973 to 31% in 1996. 
 11
with Hainan, Shantou, Shenzen, Zhuhai and Xiamen) where new export-
oriented industries (largely funded by foreign capital in the form of joint 
ventures and/or fully foreign owned subsidiaries) could emerge in an 
environment where developments and decision-making were mainly market 
driven. 
Figure 1 illustrates the effectiveness of these policies in terms of increases 
in per capita GDP and also provides a comparison with three specimen 
countries that followed the Big Bang approach to structural reform (New 
Zealand, an OECD economy from the start and Hungary and Romania, 
initially centrally planned economies). For the right interpretation of the graph 
it is important to note that the first Chinese steps in the 1970s already doubled 
income per head and the same achievement can be observed in the 1980s 
(when the newly established market mechanisms and improved allocation 
stimulated the economic dynamism). The productivity increase since the start 
of the Millennium, although of course much larger in absolute terms, is of 
comparable relative strength. Figure 1 clearly illustrates the continuing positive 
trend in China’s average GDP per capita, which contrasts with the large 
fluctuations and drops in the other countries.5 
1.2 The future course of Chinese policy change 
The appropriate metaphor for policy making in China is the oil tanker, not the 
sailing yacht. It is unlikely that Chinese policy makers will be tempted to 
change the course of their economic policies and opt for quick and ad hoc 
changes, given the (also comparatively) good performance of the Chinese 
economy and the managed transition that its development policy so far 
achieved. Importantly, many macroeconomic distortions (‘policy burdens’) are 
still in place and here a gradual approach will have to be followed if a decrease 
in per capita income is to be avoided (such a drop would increase the risks of 
instability and thus the political costs of structural change). Moreover, China 
weathered the crisis quite well. Gong and De Haan (2011) argue that China 
was actually well-prepared for the crisis, probably having learnt the lessons 
from the Asian crisis in 1997–98: ‘This appears directly in line with China’s 
pragmatic reform policies which had become its hallmark since 1978’ (Gong 
and De Haan 2011, p. 231). On balance a gradual approach regarding reform 
towards a social market economy is thus the most likely scenario. One-size-
fits-all recipes will not be followed and also more ideologically inspired visions 
of market economics will not have an impact on policy makers in Beijing. This 
is not to say that policies will remain the same. Important changes have taken 
place and will take place. One such important step forward consists of the 
changes in competition policies and regimes that took effect as of February 
2011.6 
                                                 
5 The only exception is a short phase of stagnation due to the Asian Crisis in 1997-8. 
6 In addition to the issues that are discussed in Table 2, on March 4, 2011 a set of 
‘national security’ procedures regarding the merger review process came into effect 
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2 Introduction and Modernization of  Competition Laws 
in China 
China’s socialist tradition and culture differ considerably from that of the 
advanced economies. In China the commercial laws and regulations are still 
under construction. Private ownership was gradually introduced since the 
1980s, but it was only explicitly allowed across the whole spectrum of the 
economy in 2004 when the Chinese National People’s Congress amended the 
Constitution so as to explicitly protect private ownership of property, 
businesses and wealth. It actually took quite a long time for China to reach 
consensus on a competition law due to the fundamental issues arising from 
China’s historic transformation from a centrally-planned economy to a market 
economy, including the role of the state-owned enterprises, perceived excessive 
competition, mergers and acquisitions by foreign companies, the treatment of 
administrative monopolies, and antitrust enforcement (Owen, Sun and Zheng 
2007; Van Sinderen and Severijnen, 2008, provide a useful overview in Dutch). 
As in other aspects of economic policy, competition policy reform was gradual, 
pragmatic and deliberate, but it also often turned out to be inconsistent. 
According to Xiaofei (2008, p. 497) the result is ‘a fragmented legal framework 
against restrictive behaviour in the Chinese market’.  Table 2 highlights the key 
legislative steps of the Chines government since the introduction of the first 
competition law in 1993.  
2.1 Catalytic impact of WTO accession 
The movement towards a modern competition framework was thus for long 
essentially gradual and slow. In 2001, however, China entered the WTO and 
agreed to abide by global trade rules. Of particular relevance were China’s new 
commitments regarding  
 the non-discriminatory treatment to all foreign individuals and 
enterprises, including those not (yet) invested or registered in China 
with respect to the right to trade;  
 the elimination of dual pricing practices as well as differences in 
treatment accorded to the location of final consumption; and  
 the use price controls (which would no longer afford protection to 
domestic industries or services providers). 
                                                                                                                            
that offers a formal understanding and interpretation of Article 31 of the AML (China 
State Council 2011). See also Section 3.2 below. 
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TABLE 2 
 Introduction of competition laws in China 
Year Law Key features 
1993 Law against unfair competition Condemnation of abusive conduct of 
public enterprises and supervision 
assigned to SAIC 
1997 Price law NDRC established as supervisor 
regarding restrictive agreements, in 
particular price cartels and including price 
fixing, predatory pricing and price 
discrimination 
1999 Law on Bid Invitation and Bidding regulates cartel activities in fields such as 
procurement that require bidding. 
2003 Interim provisions on Mergers and 
Acquisitions of Domestic 
Enterprises by Foreign Investors 
MOCFOM (together with SAIC) entrusted 
with supervision; only for mergers and 
acquisitions involving foreign firms 
2003 Tentative Provision on Prohibition 
of Acts of Price Monopolization 
administrative rules which prohibit the 
abuse of “market dominance.” The rules 
also contain prohibitions against price 
coordination, supply restriction, bid 
rigging, vertical price restraint, below-cost 
pricing, and price discrimination, which 
are described as abuses of dominance. 
The rules also prohibit government 
agencies from “illegally intervening” in 
market price determinations. 
2004 The Foreign Trade Law updated in 2004, prohibits monopolistic 
behaviour and unfair competition in 
foreign trade activities. 
2006 Provision on Mergers and 
Acquisitions of Domestic 
Enterprises by Foreign Investors 
administrative rules on notification 
requirements and the terms of an antitrust 
review for pending mergers 
2007 Anti Monopoly Law mainly deals with concentration of 
operators, monopoly agreements and 
abuse of dominant market position and 
resembles the provisions of antitrust laws 
in typical market-oriented economies 
2011 Rules on the Prevention and 
Restriction of Price-related 
Monopoly Conduct (the NDRC 
Rules) 
SAIC Monopoly Agreements 
Rules 
SAIC Dominant Position Rules 
Rules on the Prohibition of Abuse 
of Administrative Power resulting 
in the elimination or restriction of 
competition. 
 
The rules will guide the enforcement of 
the Anti-Monopoly Law against price-
related and non-price related anti-
competitive conduct. 
The NDRC Rules clarify the kind of anti-
competitive conduct between competitors 
and conduct between companies and 
business partners that the NDRC will 
investigate.  
The SAIC Rules clarify the types of 
agreements and concerted practices that 
are prohibited under the AML. The 
provisions mainly address commercial 
practices between competitors but 
provide a catch-all prohibition against 
anti-competitive agreements that may 
apply to companies operating at different 
levels of the supply chain. 
Sources: Compiled by the authors and based on studies by Xiaofei 2008, Mehra and Yanbei 2008 and 
Wang et al. 2011 
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Importantly, the WTO Agreement required implementation in an effective and 
uniform manner by revising the then existing domestic laws and the enacting 
of new legislation fully in compliance with the WTO Agreement.  
The economic implication of China’s WTO membership was that barriers 
to foreign goods would shrink as the door to foreign investment opened. 
Foreign retail firms could set up wholly owned outlets and sell goods that were 
not produced in China. As a consequence the number of foreign firms entering 
China increased, but the entering foreign firms were confronted with the fact 
that the conduct of Chinese firms was (generally speaking) not governed by 
codified law. The use of administrative power to reward local industry creates 
dangerous opportunities for rent seeking. Favored firms and industries can 
develop quite cozy relationships with local and regional officials. This is 
especially relevant since for China as a socialist-market economy, the state still 
remains the dominant economic actor. Competition between companies 
increased but also the risk of anti-competitive conduct of companies and abuse 
of dominant position by state actors spread.  Laws actually varied greatly from 
region to region and depended on local traditions, but also on the preferences 
of local government and supervisors. It became therefor increasingly clear that 
WTO membership would also have legal implications for China in order to 
provide a level playing field inside the country. 
2.2 European perspective 
It became thus increasingly clear that better, more coherent and 
comprehensive rules regarding (non) competitive behavior were necessary. For 
China competition is an unfamiliar concept. Since making its transitions to a 
market-oriented economy, attention is being paid to the importance of 
competition as an institution. As a result China has been looking to the 
antitrust laws developed in Western countries for guidance in designing its 
competition policies and institutions. On 6 May 2004 the Ministry of 
Commerce of China and the Directorate General for Competition of 
European Commission reached agreement on a structured dialogue on 
competition.7 China has formulated various competition-related policies, laws 
and regulations. On its side, the EU has a relatively complete set of 
competition legislation. This provides a basis for a dialogue between both 
parties on competition legislation and enforcement. The primary objective is to 
establish a permanent forum of consultation and transparency, and to enhance 
the EU’s technical and capacity-building assistance to China in the area of 
competition policy. 
Interestingly, the European experience – from a historical perspective – 
shares some similarities with the present Chinese situation and this may 
provide some useful lessons. At the start of the 1990s the European 
competition landscape was a spaghetti bowl of national and inconsistent 
competition laws based on different principles (Table 3). The Netherlands, for 
                                                 
7 ‘Declaration on the Start of a Dialogue on Competition by the EU and China’ and 
‘Terms Of  Reference Of The EU-China Competition Policy Dialogue’ document 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/legislation/china.pdf. 
 15
example, deployed the Abuse Principle that legally allowed cartel activities – 
and actually approved notified cartels – unless these cartels did ‘proven harm’ 
to the economy. Also the size, independence and competence of the 
institutions that supervised markets differed greatly across Europe (in the 
Netherlands the task was devoted to a relatively small section in the ministry of 
Economic Affairs and no economic merger review existed).8 It was only after 
the Europe 1992 initiative aimed at the completion of the European internal 
market and the EMU project that competition policy was harmonized (so that 
a level playing field emerged) and the EU Commission became a powerful 
supervisor. The implication is that – while scope continues to exist for local 
supervisors and specialization – integration, coordination and harmonization 
are pre-requisites for achieving effective supervision.   
TABLE 3 
 The European spaghetti bowl of competition policy institutions in 1996 
Country Competition agency Indepen-
dent 
Principle Enforcement 
Belgium Dienst van de 
Mededinging 
No Prohibition Administrative 
Denmark Koncurrenceeradet Yes Abuse Administrative 
France Conseil de la Concurrence Yes Prohibition Administrative 
Germany Bundeskartelamt Yes Mixed Administrative 
Greece Επιτροπή Ανταγωνισμού No Prohibition Administrative 
Ireland Competition Authority Yes Prohibition Criminal law 
Italy Autorità garanta della 
concerrenza 
Yes Prohibition Administrative 
Netherlands Directie marktwerking No Abuse Criminal law 
Portugal Autoridade da 
Concorrencia 
Yes Prohibition Administrative 
Spain Servicio de Defensa de la 
Competencia 
Yes Prohibition Administrative 
Sweden Konkurrentverket Yes Prohibition Administrative 
UK Office of Fair Trade No Abuse Administrative 
Source: Van Bergeijk and Haffner 1996, Table 2.2, p. 27 
2.3 Big leap forward? 
After a thirteen-year legislative process, the Anti Monopoly Law (AML) was 
published in 2007 and became effective on August 1, 2008. The majority of the 
AML’s fifty-seven articles resemble the provisions of antitrust laws in typical 
market-oriented economies. The provisions aim at the prohibition of price 
fixing, monopolization, and mergers that significantly concentrate industries 
within China. While drafting the AML, China built on the experiences of 
United States and the European Union. The law contains explicit provisions 
                                                 
8 See Van Bergeijk and Haffner 1996, pp. 22-30 and especially Table 2.2 for an 
impression of this spaghetti bowl. 
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targeting anticompetitive government action – especially widespread local 
protectionism – in a large transitional economy. Since the AML's introduction 
in August 2008, much of the precedent and practice issued has focused on the 
merger control regime. Recently China's National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) and the State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce (SAIC) have issued new rules that focus on the two remaining 
traditional pillars of an antitrust regime. On February 1, 2011 these new rules 
have come into effect.  
The NDRC published rules on price related infringements. The SAIC 
published rules on non-price related infringements. While these rules offer 
clarity on these competition issues, they do overlap and thus inherently raise 
questions. In economic terms, there is little difference between an agreement 
to limit output and on the other hand a price-fixing agreement. Unlawful 
conduct can attract considerable fines (up to 10 percent of global turnover) 
and even criminal sanctions in certain cases. It is still unclear how China’s 
supervisors will enforce these laws. The powers of enforcement have been 
delegated to local enforcement agencies. This will encourage enforcement at 
local level but potentially will lead to divergences in enforcement, fining policy 
and leniency application.  
3 The Way Ahead 
Since the Second World War the world economic system absorbed several 
waves of new entrants that each did not challenge the basic underpinnings of 
its governance even though observers sometimes saw these ‘miracles’ as threats 
for the group of leading economies.   
3.1  Waves of Global Integration 
The integration of the war prone economies in Western Europe led to a strong 
economic power base of the advanced economies. The re-emergence of Japan 
as an important economic power and the subsequent advent of the Newly 
Industrializing Economies (the so-called Asian Tigers9) in the 1970s and 1980s 
did in the end not constitute a threat to the governing paradigm of 
multilateralism and markets essential because the new entrants embraced those 
principles. Likewise the fall of the Iron Curtain and the break down of the 
Soviet Union in the 1990s actually further strengthened the domination or 
market orientation. So why would it this time be different? 
Figure 2 illustrates that the difference of the new wave of global 
integration does not follow from the production share of the new entrants at 
the start of the wave (although the increase in Chin’s global production share 
over the last decade in line with the developments that were illustrated in 
Figure 1 has been spectacular indeed). The challenge that China and India pose 
to the world economic system follows from the size of their populations (and 
thus from their potential production shares that will be realized if their labour 
                                                 
9 Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore. 
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productivity catches up economy-wide). Indeed, within a decade the BRIICs 
may have a global majority share in terms of both population and production. 
This will constitute a powerful and hard to ignore base for change both 
regarding the governance of the international system and direction of the 
world economic institutions, also because key long term problems (such as 
global warming) simply cannot be solved without the BRIICs. 
FIGURE 2 
 Shares of Key Players at the Start of the Waves of Global Integration 
 
 
3.2  (Inter) National Interest 
One of the key questions from the perspective of this essay is of course if the 
Chinese strive for a social market economy by necessity requires a change of 
global competition rules. So far China has – gradually, but decisively – moved 
into the direction of a modern competition regime. This trend is, however, by 
no means certain if China’s national interests are not (perceived to be) served 
by further steps and new institutions and legislation that would be necessary to 
bring the competition regime effectively up to Western standards. In particular 
the Chinese culturally and historically determined preferences for co-ordination 
and co-operation and a longer term orientation than the market typically can 
provide, may motivate the authorities to chose for a Chinese blend of 
competition policy and industrial policy. This would not result in a system that 
meets all demands from the advanced economies, but there could be much 
wisdom in allowing the Chinese this room for manoeuvre.  
Second, international measures should not be focussed disproportionally 
against China (as presently appears to be the case both in the arena of currency 
imbalances and in terms of trade distorting measures). Such measures are not 
only dangerous because they carry the risk of retaliation (van Bergeijk 2010, 
Chapter 5), witness the new ‘national security’ considerations that – following 
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similar legislation in the advanced countries – have recently been formally 
introduced (China State Council 2011). More importantly such measures could 
potentially alienate China from the system of multilateral governance is. If so, 
global governance could develop into a multi-polar system in which small 
states align with large states while the poles in the system basically compete 
(although co-ordination an co-operation are possible of course). Typically this 
is the present format for monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies. Another 
consequence could be that regional governance systems develop that compete 
with (multilateral) forms of global governance.10  
If the market system is considered to be the best – or the optimal – system 
available and if this system should continue to be the basis of global integration 
in a multilateral setting, then the industrialized world should not to alienate 
China (and the other BRIIC countries for that matter) from that system. First 
of all, this implies that rather than simply imposing Western norms and values 
one should respect the difficulties and choices underlying the Chinese 
development model. Being patient may have a high payoff if the ultimate result 
is that China continues to move into the right direction. Overreaction against 
emerging economic powers is not a sensible recipe if one wants to get their 
commitment to an open multilateral system. 
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